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CHAPTER 5 
Domestic Relations 
MONROE L. INKER" 
PAUL P. PEROCCHI"" 
JOSEPH H. WALSH""" 
§5.1. Divorce-Alimony and Assignment of Property. During the 
Survey year, the Appeals Court in two significant cases continued its 
construction of section 34 of chapter 208 of the General Laws as 
amended by the statutes of 1974.1 In following the groundwork laid 
by Bianco v. Bianco,2 Putnam v. Putnam,3 and Rice v. Rice,4 the court 
has further elucidated the nature of awards of alimony and assignment 
of property.5 
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§5.1. 1 G.L. c. 208, § 34, as amended by Acts of 1974, c. 565, Acts of ,1975, c. 
400, § 33, and Acts of 1977, c. 467, provides: 
Upon divorce or upon motion in an action brought at any time after a divorce, 
the court may make a judgment for either of the parties to pay alimony to 
the other. In addition to or in lieu of a judgment to pay alimony, the court 
may assign to either husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the 
other. In determining the amount of alimony, if any, to be paid, or in fixing 
the nature and value of the property, if any, to be so assigned, the court, after 
hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, shall consider the length of the 
marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, health, station, 
occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, 
liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for 
future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court may also consider the 
contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation 
in 'value of their I'espective estates and the contribution of each of the parties 
as a homemaker to the family unit. 
2 371 Mass. 420, 358 N.E.2d 243 (1976). 
3 5 Mass. App. Ct. 10,358 N.E.2d 837 (1977). 
4 372 Mass. 398, 361 N.E.2d 1305 (1977). 
5 For an analysis of the Bianco and Rice decisions see Inker, Perocchi, and Walsh, 
Divorce-Alimony and Assignment of Property, 1977 ANN. Sunv. MASS. LAW § 1.2, 
at 7-11. 
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In Maze v. Mihalovich,6 the Appeals Court held that to the extent 
that a probate court fails to make a disposition of all the parties' prop-
erties in a divorce judgment, the parties may return after the entry of 
a judgment nisi of divorce and seek disposition of that property. 7 The 
plaintiff-wife was granted a judgment of divorce nisi 8 on March 12, 
1976.!l The wife was granted custody of the two minor children.10 The 
judgment ordered the defendant-husband to pay to the wife $35 per 
week as alimony and child support.11 The judgment made no provi-
sions for the division of any real or personal property owned by the 
parties.12 
The parties owned a parcel of real estate as tenants by the entirety.13 
On September 12, 1976, when the divorce became final, the parties 
held the real estate as tenants in common.14 On October 8, 1976, the 
wife received notice that the husband sought a partition of this prop-
erty.15 The wife then brought an action in the probate court pursuant 
to chapter 208, section 34,16 seeking a conveyance to her of the hus-
band's interest in the property.Ii The husband moved to dismiss the 
wife's action on the ground that chapter 208, section 34, "does not pro-
vide authority to convey real estate at a time subsequent to a divorce 
when an order of alimony has been made in the judgment of divorce." 18 
The probate court granted the husband's motion.19 
The Appeals Court dismissed the wife's appeal as premature,20 but 
ruled that the husband's motion to dismiss should not have been al-
lowed.21 The court, citing Bianco v. Bianco,22 held that since the parties' 
property rights had not previously been adjudicated, the probate court 
could assign the property pursuant to chapter 208, section 34.23 The 
6 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 578, 387 N.E.2d 196. 
7 ld. at 579, 387 N.E.2d at 197. 
8 C.L. c. 208, § 21, proVides that "[j]udgments of divorce shall in the first 
instance be judgments nisi, and shall become absolute after the expiration of six 
months from the entry thereof .... " 
9 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 578, 387 N.E.2d at 197. 
10 ld. 
o 11 ld. 
121d. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. See Childs v. Childs, 293 Mass. 67, 71, 199 N.E. 383, 386 (1936). 
15 1979 Mass App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 578, 387 N.E.2d at 197. 
16 See note 1 supra. 
17 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 578-79, 387 N.E.2d at 197. 
18 ld. at 579, 387 N.E.2d at 197. 
19 ld. 
20 ld. "As no judgment was entered (Mass. R. Dom. ReI. P. 58[a] [1975]), the 
case is prematurely before us." ld. 
21 ld. 
22 371 Mass. 420, 358 N.E.2d 243 (1976). 
23 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 579, 387 N.E.2d at 197. 
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court rejected the husband's argument that the wife was seeking addi-
tional relief in the nature of alimony.24 It noted that section 34 as 
amended empowered courts to deal broadly with property, quite apart 
from the alimony decree.25 
The husband argued further that chapter 208, section 34, should be 
construed "so as to permit the court to grant either or both types of 
relief authorized by §34 only once; namely, at the time of, divorce or 
at a later time." 26 The court dismissed this argument also. It noted 
that even prior to the 1974 amendment,27 section 34 had been construed 
to allow a petition for alimony after the entry of a judgment nisi of 
divorce where there had been no award of alimony in the original 
decree.28 Thus, the court saw no reason why a division of property 
should not be similarly construed.29 
The mandate of the Appeals Court's decision in Mihalovich is clear. 
The probate court must consider all items of property belonging to the 
parties in making an award of alimony and property division under 
chapter 208, section 34. If items are not disposed of or litigated at the 
time of divorce, they may be the proper subject of a subsequent motion 
for the division of assets. 
Exactly two months after Mihalovich was decided, the Appeals Court 
in Putnam v. Putnam (Putnam II) 30 reaffirmed the equitable nature of 
the division of property under chapter 208, section 34. The saga of 
Putnam began with a probate court judgment providing that the marital 
home held by the defendant-wife and plaintiff-husband as tenants by 
the entirety be sold and the proceeds of the sale be divided one-third 
to the wife an~ two-thirds to the husband.31 The Appeals Court in 
Putnam v. Putnam (Putnam 1) held that because the probate judge 
may have based the assignment of property upon insufficient considera-
24 Id. at 580,387 N.E.2d at 197. 
25 Id. at 581, 387 N.E.2d at 197-98. 
26 Id. at 582,387 N.E.2d at 198. 
27 C.L. c. 208, § 34 (prior to the amendment by Acts of 1974; c. 565) provided: 
"Upon a divorce, or upon petition at any time after a divorce, the court may decree 
alimony to the wife, or a part of her estate, in the nature of alimony, to the 
husband." . 
28 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 582, 387 N.E.2d at 198 (citing Peluso v. 
Peluso, 5 Mass. App. 906, 370 N.E.2d 723 (1977); Kinosian v. Kinosian, 351 Mass. 
49, 217 N.E.2d 769 (1966); Chadbourne v. Chad1;)()Urne, 245 Mass. 383, 139 N.E. 
532 (1923); Parker v. Parker, 211 Ma!S. 139,97 N.E. 988 (1912)). 
29 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 582-83, 387 N.E.2d at 198. 
30 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1084, 389 N.E.2d 777. 
31 Putnam v. Putnam (Putnam 1), 5 Mass. App. 10, 11, 358 N.E.2d 837, 838 
(1977). 
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tions, the case should be remanded for further proceedings.32 At trial 
on remand, the parties produced no additional evidence, but instead 
rested their cases on the evidence introduced at the first trial,33 The 
judge stated that he was precluded from considering all of the fac-
tors listed in section 34,34 because the parties had not introduced evi-
dence on some of the factors. 
On the second appeal, the court stated that where the parties fail 
to provide evidence upon which a trial judge can base his findings, the 
consideration of those factors is deemed waived.a:. The husband at-
tempted to argue that the evidence was nevertheless sufficient to justify 
a division of the marital home under section 34.3(; The court, however, 
noted the lack of evidence of the noneconomic contributions to the 
marital enterprise and the scant evidence of the economic contributions 
of the parties, other than as they related to the house at issue.37 The 
court therefore refused to uphold the judgment of the probate court, 
finding that the evidence presented failed to provide a sufficient basis 
for an equitable division under section 34.3R 
The Putnam II decision is consistent with prior interpretation of 
section 34. The Supreme Judicial Court stated in Rice v. Rice 39 that "in 
future cases under [section 34] we wish to have findings, whether or 
not requested by a party ... , showing that the judge below weighed 
all the statutory factors in reaching his decision and considered no 
extraneous factors." 40 The thrust of the Putnam II com:t's decision is 
to follow the mandate of Rice by refusing to uphold a judgment where 
the judge did not properly give consideration to the factors enunciated 
in section 34. It now seems clear that a lower court must take into 
consideration all' the factors enumerated under section ~4 when ordering 
an award of alimony or a division of property and it must be clear from 
the record that the judge did in fact consider such factors.41 
32 ld. at 16, 358 N.E.2d at 842. The Appeals Court noted that .the rationale for 
the property division was not clearly stated by the probate judge. It appeared, 
however, that the judge had considered capital contributions to the property in 
question and the wife's conduct. ld. 
33 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1086, 389 N.E.2d at 778. 
34 ld. For the text of § 34 see note 1 supra. 
3G ld. at 1087, 389 N.E.2d at 778. 
36 ld. 
37 ld. at 1088, 389 N.E.2d at 779. 
38 ld. . 
3U 372 Mass. 398, 361 N .E.2d 1305 (1977). 
40 ld. at 402-03, 361 N.E.2d·'at 1308. • 
41 It should be noted that during the Survey year, the Appeals Court further 
demonstrated its approval of the statutory scheme set forth in § 34, when it held 
that § 34 was applicable even to divorce actions already in progress when § 34 
was enacted. See Zildjian v. Zildjian, 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1337, 391 
N.E.2d 697. 
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The impact of both Mihalovich and Putnam II upon the adjudication 
of property and alimony issues will further the intent of the statute.42 
Putnam II obliges the practitioner to insure that findings are clearly 
made by the judge concerning all section 34 factors in order to prevent 
any judgment from being vacated on appeal. Mihalovich cautions the 
practitioner who wishes to avoid subsequent litigation to provide the 
judge with the evidence necessary to make a disposition of all the 
property of the parties. Thus, the decisions of the Appeals Court in 
Mihalovich and Putnam II should foster the complete adjudication of 
all issues relating to the parties' divorce and the settling of all prop-
erty rights of the parties at one time. 
The courts of this commonwealth have repeatedly emphasized the 
proper ,exercise of broad discretion in assignment of property under 
section 34. In its decisions during this Survey year, the Appeals Court 
has again demonstrated its commitment to seeing that the lower courts 
consider and evaluate the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
parties in a divorce action in order to arrive at an equitable and fair 
resolution of their respective property rights. 
§5.2. Antenuptial Agreements-Duty to Disclose. In Rosenberg v. 
Lipnick,l the Supreme Judicial Court reconsidered the traditional com-
monwealth rule as established in Wellington v. Rugg 2 that nothing 
short of proof of fraud will invalidate an antenuptial agreement, irre-
spective of the unfairness of the agreement.3 While declining to apply 
a new rule to the case at bar, the Court announced that in future cases 
the law would impose on parties to an antenuptial agreement a duty of 
fair disclosure.4 
The plaintiff-wife in Rosenberg had signed in 1959 an antenuptial 
agreement which provided that she would accept $5,000 from the 
defendant-husband's estate in lieu of dower or any other rights she 
might possess should she survive him.5 Upon his death, she sought to 
invalidate the agreement on the grounds that her husband -had failed 
to disclose his assets prior to its execution. 6 Both the master and the 
probate court judge found the Wellington rule 7 controlling, thereby 
42 For a thorough discussion of the statutory intent of C.L. c. 208, § 34, see 
Inker, Walsh and Perocchi, Alimony and ASsignment of Property: The New Statu-
tory Scheme in Massachusetts, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1 (1975). 
§5.2. 1 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 853, 389 N.E.2d 385. 
2 243 Mass. 30, 136 N.E. 831 (1922). 
3 Id. at 35, 136 N.E. at 834. 
4 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 860, 389 N.E.2d at 388. 
5 Id. at 855, 389 N.E.2d at 386-87. 
6 Id. at 853, 389 N.E.2d at 386. 
7 See text at note 3 supra. 
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rendering the wife's failure to establish misrepresentation or fraudulent 
concealment of the value of the husband's assets fatal to their claim.8 
On direct appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court, thinking it un-
wise to act retroactively, declined to overrule the probate judge's de-
cision.\) 
While affirming the lower court decision upholding the agreement 
at issue, the Court set forth a new standard for agreements executed 
after the date of the opinion. 10 It observed that Massachusetts is the 
only state requiring a showing of fraud to invalidate an antenuptial 
agreement. ll The Court expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that 
the Wellington rule, which purports to acknowledge that parties to an 
antenuptial agreement stand in a confidential relationship, treats them 
as acting at arm's lengthP In fact "they occupy a relationship of 
mutual trust and confidence and as such must exercise the highest 
degree of good faith, candor, and sincerity in all matters bearing on 
the proposed agreement." 13 The Court compared the duty of disclosure 
owed by parties to an antenuptial agreement with the obligations of 
disclosure owed between a corporate director and stockholder.14 The 
Court concluded that the parties to an antenuptial agreement "by 
definition occupy a confidential relationship . . ." calling for a duty of 
disclosure for both parties.!" 
After concluding that a fair disclosure rule would apply to antenup-
tial agreements executed after March 30, 1979, the Court set forth 
factors relevant to determining the validity of future antenuptial agree-
ments.16 It stated that it would consider 
whether (1) it contains a fair and reasonable provision as measured 
at the time of its execution for the party contesting the agreement; 
. (2) the contesting party was fully informed of the other party's 
worth prior to the agreement's execution, or had, or should have 
had, independent knowledge of the other party's worth; and (3) 
a waiver by the, contesting party is set forth.H 
8 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 854, 389 N.E.2d at 386. 
9 ld. The Court noted, however, that even under a fair disclosure rule the wife 
would not be entitled to relief on the facts of this case. She had been advised 
by counsel to request disclosure but had declined to do so, for fear that such a step 
could jeopardize the marriage. ld. at 861-62, 389 N.E.2d at 389. 
10 ld. The Gourt's decision was handed down March 30, 1979. ld. at 853, 389 
N.E.2d at 385. 
11 ld. at 858, 389 N.E.2d at 387. 
12 ld. at 858-59, 389 N.E.2d at 387. 
13 ld. at 858-59, 389 N.E.2d at 387-88. 
14 ld. at 860, 389 N.E.2d at 388. 
15 ld. 
16 ld. at 860-61, 389 N.E.2d at 388. 
17 ld. 
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It also noted that appropriate reference could be made to such factors 
as the parties' respective worth, ages, intelligence, literacy, business 
acumen, and prior family ties and commitments.18 The Court explained 
that these factors should be employed to give effect to the intentions 
of the parties in construing antenuptial agreements, while at the same 
time ensuring that antenuptial agreements are "executed fairly and 
understandingly . . . free from fraud, imposition, deception, or over-
reaching." 19 
The Rosenberg Court's decision is a further acknowledgment of the 
equality and honesty that should be present throughout the marital 
relationship. It seems only just that where parties enter into an agree-
ment controlling their respective future property rights, full disclosure 
of the circumstances and factors of such property rights be made avail-
able so that each party's execution of the agreement will be the result 
of an informed decision. This principle has long been recognized in 
contract law, and its application to antenuptial agreements is long 
overdue. 
§5.3. Judgment of Divorce Nisi-Grant of Stay Pending Appeal. In 
Singer v. Singer,l the Appeals Court held that the entry of a judgment 
of divorce nisi for one spouse, even though stayed pending appeal, 
precludes the entry of a judgment of divorce nisi for the other spouse 
unless the divorce is stayed for "sufficient cause" under chapter 208, 
section 21, of the General Laws.2 The court also held that one party's 
desire not to be adjudged the guilty party is not "sufficient cause" 
within the meaning of section 21.3 
The Singer case arose out of three separate actions filed by the parties 
concerning their marital difficulties. The wife Originally filed an action 
for separate support on August 9, 1974, on the ground of cruel and 
abusive treatment.4 Subsequently, the husband filed a complaint for 
divorce, also alleging cruel and abusive treatment.5 The two cases 
were referred to a master who filed his report on the husband's action 
on February 28, 1977, and on the wife's action one day later.6 After 
18 Id. at 862, 389 N.E.2d at 389. 
19 Id. 
§5.3. 1 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1491, 391 N.E.2d 1239. 
2 Id. at 1495, 391 N.E.2d at 1242. Chapter 208, § 21, provides in part: "Judg-
ments of divorce shall in the first instance be judgments nisi, and shall become 
absolute after the expiration of six months from the entry thereof, unless the court 
within said period, for sufficient cause, upon application of any party to the action, 
otherwise orders." . 
3 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1497, 391 N.E.2d at 1242. 
4 Id. at 1493, 391 N.E.2d at 1241. 
5 Id. 
6Id. 
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the filing of the master's reports, and after it became clear that a divorce 
would be granted to the husband, the wife filed her complaint for 
divorce on the ground of adultery.' The judge denied the wife's mo-
tion to stay the proceedings and entered a judgment of divorce nisi 
on the husband's complaint.8 After the entry of the judgment nisi for 
the husband, the wife filed a notice of appeal and moved to stay that 
judgment, both on the ground of her appeal and on the ground of her 
pending divorce action.n A second judge allowed the wife's motion 
for a stay on December 23, 1977.10 The wife then appeared hefore a 
third judge in the uncontested session of the court, at which time 
uncontradicted evidence of the husband's adultery was introducedP 
The third judge reported the question of whether the wife was entitled 
to pursue her complaint for divorce after judgment nisi had been en-
tered on the husband's complaint.12 
In answering this question in the negative, the Appeals Court stated 
that although the husband and wife can each obtain a divorce,13 this 
result is only possible if both actions are timely brought.14 The court 
restated the strong policy of resolving all aspects of the dispute be-
tween the former spouses in one proceeding.15 It observed that after 
an action for divorce has been litigated and a judgment nisi entered, 
additional proceedings should be entertained cautiously and then only 
if they serve some legal purpose.16 
In analyzing the possible legal purposes for the wife's attempt to 
secure a second judgment, the Appeals Court concluded that there 
were none.17 The court first examined the effect of a second judgment 
in the absence of a stay of the first judgment. Because the first judg-
7 Id. She filed her complaint the day before the first hearing on the adoption 
of the master's report, although she had known of her husband's adultery as early 
as November 3, 1975. Id. 
sId. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 1494, 391 N.E.2d at 1241. 
11 ld. 
12 Id. The question reported by the third ,trial judge was as follows: 
Whether the plaintiff in her complaint for divorce on grounds for adultery 
filed during the. pendency of husband's complaint but not consolidated and 
heard therewith, is entitled to pursue her complaint after a Judgment Nisi has 
been entered on husband's complaint, which Judgment is pending in the 
Appeals Court on wife's appeal and which Judgment has been stayed and has 
not yet become absolute. 
ld. 
13 Id. at 1495, 391 N.E.2d at 1292. See Gilmore v. Gilmore, 369 Mass. 598, 599, 
341 N.E.2d 655, 656 (1976). 
14 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1495, 391 N.E.2d at 1242. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 1495-96, 391 N.E.2d at 1242. 
17 Id. at 1496-1501, 391 N.E.2d at 1242-44. 
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ment mSl would become final six months after its entry, thereby ab-
solutely dissolVing the marriage, the second judgment would be of no 
effect because the matter would have been finally adjudged before the 
second nisi could become final. 18 Thus, unless the first judgment is 
stayed, the second judgment nisi is a nullity.19 
The wife argued that a stay of the first judgment would permit her 
to pursue her pending divorce action.20 By obtaining a divorce on 
the grounds of adultery, she contended that she would thus not be 
characterized as the guilty party and would therefore be entitled to a 
more favorable alimony award under chapter 208, section 34, which 
requires a consideration of the "conduct of the parties during the mar-
riage." 21 The Appeals Court dismissed this argument as based on an 
assumption that did not reflect Massachusetts law.22 The court ob-
served that even when a complaint for divorce was based solely on 
fault, alimony was determined not on fault, but rather on finances.23 
The court further observed that chapter 208, section 34, enacted by 
chapter 565 of the Acts of 1974, was not intended to place any greater 
emphasis on fault or on who obtained the divorce.24 It concluded 
that the wife's attempt to obtain a second judgment based on the 
husband's infidelity served no legal purpose and was, therefore, not a 
"sufficient cause" for a stay pursuant to chapter lOS, section 21.25 
The convoluted procedural history of this case can in large part be 
attributed to the misapprehension on the part of the wife's counsel 
that there was something to be gained by having the husband found 
guilty of adultery. The inclusion of "conduct of the parties" within the 
new alimony and assignment of property statute 26 was apparently the 
18 ld. at 1496, 391 N.E.2d at 1242. 
19 ld. 
20 ld. at 1497, 391 N.E.2d at 1242. 
21 ld. at 1498, 391 N.E.2d at 1242-43. The statute, C.L. c. 208, § 34, prOVides 
in part: 
In determining the amount of alimony, if any, to be paid, or in fixing the 
nature and value of the property, if any, to be so asSigned, the court, after 
hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, shall consider the length of the 
marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, health, 
station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employ-
ability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and opportunity I?f 
each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court may also 
consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation 
or appreciation in value of their respective estates and the cdntribution of each 
of the parties as a homemaker to the family unit. 
22 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1498, 391 N.E.2d at 1243. 
~M . 
24 rd. at 1501, 391 N.E.2d at 1244. 
25 rd. 
26 C.L. c. 208, § 34. For the text of this statute, see note 21 supra. 
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basis for this misapprehension. Singer is a clear statement to the prac-
titioner that the new statute has not introduced "guilt" as a factor to 
be considered in alimony and assignment of property cases. As the 
court pOinted out, "conduct of the parties" has many aspects, positive 
as well as negative, and is not limited to marital fault. Furthermore, 
conduct is only one of the many factors that the statute requires the 
court to consider. Practitioners should, therefore, make certain that 
the court is provided with evidence sufficient to sustain findings in all 
of the enumerated categories. 
§5.4. Divorce-Jurisdiction Over Minor Children Under Chapter 
208, Section 29. In Gil tl. Servizio,1 the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that the probate court had jurisdiction over the two minor children 
of the plaintiH-mother under section 29 of chapter 208 of the General 
. Laws,2 notwithstanding the fact that the children-who regularly re-
sided in Michigan-had been in Massachusetts for only two days prior 
to the commencement of the action.3 The husband and wife in Gil 
were married in Massachusetts in 1969.4 Two children were born of 
the marriage.:; Marital difficulties developed, and the husband sub-
sequently obtained a divorce from a Haitian court.6 The decree 
awarded him custody of the children.7 At the time of the Haitian 
decree both the parents and the children were dorniciliaries and resi-
dents of Massachusetts.R After obtaining the divorce the husband left 
Massachusetts with the children.n After a year's stay in his native Italy, 
the husband returned with the children in April 1974 and established 
residence in Detroit, Michigan.10 The parties were briefly reconciled 
in Detroit, but the wife soon returned to Massachusetts,u In April 
1975, the wife returned to Detroit to see her children and was alarmed 
§5.4. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1222,375 N.E.2d 716. 
2 C.L. c. 208, § 29, provides: 
If, after a divorce has been adjudged in another jurisdiction, minor children 
of the marriage are inhabitants of, or residents in this commonwealth, the superior 
court or probate court for the county in which said minors or any of them are 
inhabitants or residents, upon an action of either parent or of a next friend in 
behalf of the children, after notice to both parents, shall have the same power to 
make judgments relative to their care, custody, education and maintenance, and 
to revise and alter such judgments or make new judgments, as if the divorce 
had been adjudged in this commonwealth. 
3 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1222, 375 N.E.2d 716. 
4 Id. at 1223, 375 N.E.2d at 718. 
I) Id. 
6Id. 
7 Id. 
SId. 
old. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 1223-24, 375 N.E.2d at 718. 
l 
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at the condition in which they were living.12 After an unsuccessful 
attempt to obtain legal assistance in Detroit, the wife took the children, 
without the husband's consent, back to Massachusetts.1s 
Two days after the wife arrived in Massachusetts, she petitioned the 
probate court, pursuant to chapter 208, section 29, for an award of 
both temporary and permanent custody.14 The husband entered a 
special appearance to contest the court's jurisdictiorr}5 Temporary 
custody was first given to the mother and then to the Department of 
Public Welfare.16 The judge of probate returned custody of the chil-
dren to the father.H After a full hearing, the probate court granted 
the husband's motion to dismiss, and the petition was dismissed with 
prejudice,18 
Granting the wife's application for direct appellate review, the Su-
preme Judicial Court noted initially that the children were not in-
habitants of Massachusetts.1ll For purposes of chapter 208, section 29, 
inhabitant is synonymous with "domiciliary." 20 The Court found that 
the children were domiciled in Michigan, since Michigan was the 
domicile of the parent who had lawful custody of them.21 The Court 
therefore concluded that jurisdiction under section 29 would lie only 
if the children were found to be residents of Massachusetts.22 This 
well-recognized distinction between domicile and residence, which was 
not directly addressed in the opinion, provided the Court with a firm 
basis for the meaning which it attributed to the latter under the statute. 
In conSidering the question of the children's residency, the Court 
discussed the case of Aufiero v. Aufiero,23 which had defined residence 
as "expected permanence in way of personal presence ... intended 
continuance as distinguished from speedy change." 24 Following Au-
fiero, the Court declared that the controlling factor in determining 
12 Id. at 1224, 375 N.E.2d at 718. There was evidence that the daughter, who 
was three and one-half years old, had a type of venereal disease. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1224, 375 N.E.2d at 718-19. The husband also filed a complaint in the 
probate court charging his wife with fraudulently taking the children from his 
custody. Id. at 1224 n.5, 375 N.E.2d at 719 n.5. 
16 Id. at 1224, 375 N.E.2d at 719. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 1225, 375 N.E.2d at 719. 
19 Id. Neither party challenged the validity of the Haitian decree and the Court 
therefore assumed it was valid. Id. 
20 Id. (citing Glass v. Glass, 260 Mass. 562, 565,157 N.E. 621, 622 (1927)). 
21 Id. at 1225-26, 375 N.E.2d at 719. 
22 Id. at 1226, 375 N.E.2d at 719. For the text of the statute see note 2 supra. 
23 322 Mass. 149, 123 N.E.2d 709 (1955). 
24 Id. at 153, 123 N.E.2d at 711 (quoting from City of Marlborough v. Lynn, 275 
Mass. 394, 397, 176 N.E. 214, 215 (1931)). 
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residence was not the length of time the children spent in Massachu-
setts prior to the commencement of the suit, hut rather the nature of 
the period spent in the commonwealth.25 While noting that the chil-
dren in the instant case had spent only two days in Massachusetts prior 
to the mother's filing of her petition, the Court stated that "the actions 
of the plaintiff [the wife] prior to her filing of the custody petition . . . 
were intended to secure permanent residence of her children in Massa-
chusetts." 26 In the Court's view, the evidence justified a finding that 
the wife was concerned about the conditions in which the children 
were living in Detroit and brought the children to Massachusetts "in 
the hope of providing a better home for them with herself." 27 This 
intention to make Massachusetts the permanent home of the children, 
coupled with the children's prior connection to Massachusetts, would 
be sufficient, the Court ruled, if found as fact by the probate judge, to 
satisfy a finding of residence notwithstanding the fact that the children 
were in Massachusetts for only two days before the wife brought her 
petition.28 
The Court used a substantive footnote at the end of the opinion as 
a vehicle for expressing its concern with the problem of "child snatch-
ing," a practice it was confident would not be encouraged by its deci-
sion in this case.29 The Court noted the recent trend, exemplified by 
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, to restrict jurisdiction of 
courts in custody cases. It considered this decision not contrary to 
this trend, because this case involvec;l more than mere phYSical presence 
in the commonwealth.3Q Thus, the Court concluded that this case 
presented a proper occasion for a finding of jurisdiction under chapter 
208, section 29. 
§5.5. Child Custody-Conflict of Laws'. In Doe v. Roe,! the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered whether the probate court 
properly refused to exercise its jurisdiction over a resident unmarried 
father's custody suit where the child and its mother were residents of 
New Hampshire. The plaintiff-father and the defendant-mother had 
been students in the commonwealth in 1977.2 Their parents resided 
25 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1227, 375 N.E.2d at 720. 
26 ld. 
27 ld. at 1228, 375 N.E.2d at 720. 
28 ld. Furthennore, the Court considered it significant that both children were 
born in Massachusetts and had close relatives in the commonwealth at the time of 
the suit. In addition, the Court was of the opinion that the presence of both parties 
before it would insure "an adversary proceeding and a more complete presentation 
of the important circumstances of the case." ld. 
29 ld. at 1229 n.ll, 375 N.E.2d at 720-21 n.ll. 
30 ld. 
§5.5. ! 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 789, 387 N.E.2d 143. 
2 ld. 
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in New Hampshire.3 The couple was engaged to be married in the 
fall of 1977, but in October 1977 the engagement was terminated.4 In 
November 1977, the defendant informed the plaintiff that she was 
seven months pregnant.o The plaintiff and defendant remained on 
friendly terms while the defendant sought prenatal care.6 A child was 
born to the defendant on January 27, 1978.7 Both parties acknowledged 
the plaintiff's paternity.8 On February 24, 1978, the child's mother, 
after informing the plaintiff, took the child to her parent's home in 
Windham, New Hampshire, where the child remained.9 When the 
case was heard, the defendant also resided in New Hampshire.10 The 
plaintiff continued to attend a school in Boston, but by agreement he 
visited the child every other week in New Hampshire.ll 
On March 8, 1978, the plaintiff commenced an action in Suffolk 
Probate Court to secure custody of the child or, in the alternative, lesser 
parental rights.12 In-hand service of summons and complaint was 
made on the defendant in Boston.13 The defendant moved to dismiss 
plaintiff's action on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter.14 Her motion was granted and plaintiffs complaint was dis-
missed.10 Plaintiff's case was granted direct appellate review by the 
Supreme Judicial Court.16 While recognizing that the Massachusetts 
probate court had competency to hear the claims of the unmarried 
parents concerning the care and custody of their child, as well as suf-
ficient jurisdiction over the defendant to satisfy minimum contacts re-
quirements,17 the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the 
lower court on the ground that New Hampshire was better situated to 
hear the case.18 
At the outset, the Court adopted the approach of the Restatement 
( Second) of Conflict of Laws.19 it recognized three alternative grounds 
3 Id. at 789, 387 N.E.2d at 143-44. 
4 Id. at 789, 387 N.E.2d at 144. 
I> Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 789-90, 387 N.E.2d at 144. 
9 Id. at 790, 387 N.E.2d at 144. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. His offer to contribute to the maintenance of the child was refused. Id. 
12 Id. 
13Id. 
14 ld. 
11> Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 793, 387 N.E.2d at 144. See Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 
84 (1978), and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
18 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 793-94, 387 N.E.2d at 145. 
19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971). Section 79 
prOVides: 
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for judicial jurisdiction in custody cases: a) the child's domicile in the 
state; b) the child's presence in the state; or, c) personal jurisdiction 
over the contestants. 20 Massachusetts was the state where both parties 
were present at commencement of the action, and both plaintiff and 
defendant were subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Massachusetts 
probate court.21 Massachusetts was also the birthplace of the child.22 
Recognizing these contacts, the Court acknowledged that the Massa-
chusetts probate court had the power to hear the case.23 Nevertheless, 
after balancing the respective interests of Massachusetts and New Hamp-
shire in the controversy, the Court concluded that New Hampshire, the 
state of the child's domicile, was the preferable forum.24 New Hamp-
shire was the state where the child was then living with its mother.25 
The Court found that, as a practical matter, the advantage of conduct-
ing a lawsuit about the interests of the parents in this child and in 
producing a sensible and manageable judgment lay with the courts 
of New Hampshire.26 The Court considered any inconvenience to the 
plaintiff, as a Massachusetts resident and student, of attending litigation 
in New Hampshire, to be outweighed by these other factors.27 
In rendering its decision, the Supreme JudiCial Court disregarded 
the differences in New Hampshire and Massachusetts law concerning 
child custody rights and the related effects on the outcome of plaintifFs 
claim.28 The Supreme JudiCial Court also put to one side the question 
of possible application of New Hampshire law to a custody action heard 
by the Massachusetts probate court.29 In so doing, the Supreme Judicial 
Court did not consider the effect of any principles of domestic rela-
tions law on the parties to the case. The case was classified by the 
Supreme Judicial Court as a conflicts of laws case rather than a domes-
tic relations case. For the Court, the real issue was not the con-
sequences to the parties concerned of applying Massachusetts law or 
New Hampshire law in the lawsuit, but rather was whether or not to 
Custody of the Person. A State has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to 
detennine the custody, or to appoint a guardian, of the person of a child or 
adult (a) who is domiciled in the state, or (b) who is present in the state, or 
( c) who is neither domiciled nor present in the state, if the controversy is 
between two or more persons who are personally subject to the jurisdiction of 
the state. 
20 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 791, 387 N.E.2d at 144. 
21 ld. at 1327, 389 N.E.2d at 1001-02. 
22 ld. 
231d. 
24 ld. at 794, 387 N.E.2d at 145. 
25 ld. 
26 ld. 
27 ld. 
28 ld. at 794, 387 N.E.2d at 145-46. 
29 ld. at 794, 389 N.E.2d at 146. 
14
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1979 [1979], Art. 8
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1979/iss1/8
158 1979 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETfS LAW §5.6 
take jurisdiction at the outset. The case thus demonstrates the steps 
involved in interest-weighing and the new trend followed by Massa-
chusetts courts in conflicts litigation. 
§5.6. Divorce-Child Support-Support for Incapacitated Adult 
Children. In Feinberg v. Diamant 1 the Supreme Judicial Court was 
faced for the first time with the issue of whether a divorced parent 
can be compelled to contribute to the support of his mentally in~ 
capacitated adult child, and if so, whether the probate court has juris-
diction to issue such an order. 2 
In Feinberg, the retarded child's mother gained custody in a 1958 
divorce, and his father was ordered to pay support.S The child was 
institutionalized in 1968 and reached the age of majority in 1974.4 At 
that time, his mother obtained an order from the probate court making 
her a co-guardian, with an attorney, of the child and requiring the 
father to continue paying $25 per week in support.5 When the child's 
father sought to modify the order, a probate judge revoked it, finding 
that the probate court had not had jurisdiction to make such an order.6 
The guardians appealed to the Appeals Court and the Supreme Judicial 
Court on its own initiative ordered direct appellate review.7 
The Court noted that it had never squarely faced the issue of whether 
a parent has a duty to support an adult child.8 Following well settled 
authOrity, the Court stated that in general there was no such duty.9 
The Court, however, found an exception to this lack of duty in a 
common law rule requiring a parent who is financially able to support 
an adult child who is as "helpless and incapable of making his support 
as is an infant." 10 
The Court specifically declined to say whether it would follow other 
jurisdictions in limiting the parental obligation only to children who 
were incapacitated before reaching the age of majority.11 On the 
other hand, ,the Court refused to accept the idea that parents must 
§5.6. 1 1979 ~ass. Adv. Sh. 1321, 389 N.E.2d 998. 
21d. 
SId. at 1322, 389 N.E.2d at 998. 
41d. 
II ld. 
Old. at 1323, 389 N.E.2d at 998. 
7 ld. at 1323, 389 N.E.2d at 999-1000. 
8 ld. at 1323, 389 N.E.2d at 1000. 
91d. 
10 ld. at 1325, 389 N.E.2d at 1000 (citing Crain v. Mallone, 130 Ky. 125, 129-30, 
113 S.W. 67, 68 (1908». 
11 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1325, 389 N.E.2d at 1001. There was no need for the 
Court to decide this point since the child in question clearly was incapacitated at 
his coming of age. ld. 
15
Inker et al.: Chapter 5: Domestic Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1979
§5.6 DOMESTIC RELATIONS 159 
provide support for these adult children if they live at home, but not 
otherwise.12 This per se rule would be unfair to children who were 
institutionalized or whose parents were separated or divorced.13 Al-
though the Feinberg case involved divorced parents, it is apparent that 
the Supreme Judicial Court used the case to formulate a general duty 
for all parents to support incapacitated adult children. Attempts to 
limit its scope would probably be unsuccessful. 
Turning to the jurisdictional issue, the Supreme Judicial Court found 
that the probate court had erred in issuing the original support order 
after the child reached majority.14 The probate court had made the 
support order as a modification of the original order in the decree of 
divorce. 15 The Court rejected the contention that this modification was 
proper under chapter 208, section 28, which gives the probate court 
jurisdiction to order support for "minor" children.16 The Court followed 
what it found to be a majority of other jurisdictions by interpreting the 
word "minor" literally. It includes no one over the age of majority, 
even the handicapped.17 
Treating the jurisdictional issue as one of first impression,18 the Court 
quickly rejected an assertion that chapter 208, section 33, a general 
grant of jurisdiction in divorce proceedings, allowed the order.19 It 
pointed out that section 33 applied to matters arising between husband 
and wife only, while Feinberg involved an issue between parent and 
child.20 Thus, the cause of action alleged falls outside the scope of 
section 33.21 
The Supreme Judicial Court found that probate courts could order 
support for an incapacitated adult child under chapter 215, section 3, 
which gives them jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to guardian-
ships in Massachusetts.22 The probate court, which issued the post-
majority order had, therefore, erred only in making its order as a 
corollary to the divorce decree. Concluding that affirming revocation 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 1327, 389 N.E.2d at 1001-02. 
15 Id. at 1327 ,389 N.E.2d at 1001. 
16 Id. at 1326, 389 N.E.2d at 1001. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. The Court noted that in Verdone v. Verdone, 346 Mass. 263, 191 N.E.2d 
299 (1963), it had upheld a support decree requiring certain payments to a re-
tarded adult child. In Verdone, however, neither party had made jurisdiction an 
issue. Therefore, the Court concluded that its previous decision was of no prec-
edential value. Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 1327, 389 N.E.2d at 1001. 
21 Id. at 1327, 389 N.E.2d at 1001-02. 
22 Id. at 1327, 389 N.E.2d at 1002. 
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would only "be exalting fonn over substance ... ," the Court did not 
find this error sufficient to require a revocation of the support order.23 
The Court, however, did remand the case for consideration of the 
father's claim that the expenses in the support order were excessive 24 
and ordered the lower court to add the retarded son as a party to the 
petition filed by his mother and her lawyer. The Court reiterated that 
the probate court would be hearing the matter under its "general equity 
powers and powers to decide cases involving the guardianships of 
incompetents." 25 
As a result of Feinberg, a parent contemplating an action for support 
of an incompetent adult child must become a guardian of the child 
and bring the action separately from any divorce matter. The Feinberg 
Court, however, made no explicit attempt to limit its decision to divorced 
parents. There is nothing in Feinberg, for example, to prevent the 
legal guardian of an incompetent adult from suing that person's parents 
for support. 
§5.7. Divorce-Condonation-Recrimination. In Zildiian v. Zild-
iian,l the Appeals Court considered whether proof of sexual intercourse 
between the husband and wife subsequent to their separation would, 
by itself, sustain the defense of condonation.2 The court also consid-
ered whether the statute which abolished the defense of recrimination 
in divorce actions should be applied retrospectively.s 
The parties in Zildiian were married in December of 1967 and began 
to experience marital difficulties shortly thereafter.4 The husband filed 
a complaint for divorce in October of 1972 alleging cruel and abusive 
treatment.5 The wife's answer denied the allegations in the complaint 
and alleged condonation and recrimination as a defense.6 The trial 
judge found that two instances of physical attacks by the wife upon 
the husband were sufficient to sustain the husband's claim of cruel and 
abusive treatment. 7 The wife argued that the parties' sexual relations 
subsequent to the incidents of cruel and abusive treatment required the 
judge to find that the husband had condoned these incidents.8 In 
support of her position, the wife introduced as exhibits twelve hotel and 
23 ld. 
24 ld. at 1327-28, 389 N.E.2d at 1002. 
211 ld. at 1328, 389 N.E.2d at 1002. 
§5.7. 1 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1337, 391 N.E.2d 697. 
2 ld. at 1343, 391 N.E.2d at 701. 
S ld. at 1344-45, 391 N.E.2d at 702. 
4 ld. at 1339, 391 N.E.2d at 699. 
1\ ld. at 1337, 391 N.E.2d at 699. 
6 ld. at 1337-38, 391 N.E.2d at 699. 
7 ld. at 1341, 391 N.E.2d at 700. 
8 ld. at 1342, 391 N.E.2d at 701. 
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motel registration cards which the trial judge agreed "would give 
weight" to the wife's testimony of sexual relations at the times and 
places indicatedY Although the judge accepted the wife's testimony 
and her exhibits, he refused to accept the wife's contention that he 
was required to find condonation by the husband.10 
In rejecting the wife's argument, the Appeals Court stated that con-
donation is a state of mind which is to be determined upon all the 
evidence, including rational inferences. 11 The court stated that con-
donation requires a factual determination of an intent to forgive such 
as would rehabilitate the relationship and transform it into a significant 
marriage.12 In the absence of clear error, a trial court's determination 
will not be disturbed on appeaJ.13 On the issue of sexual relations, the 
Appeals Court observed that even fifty years ago, when sexual relations 
may have been viewed as more significant, the Supreme Judicial Court, 
in Coan v. Coan,H refused to go beyond holding that sexual intercourse 
"ordinarily implies" condonation.15 The Appeals Court quoted lan-
guage from Littlefield v. Littlefield,16 in which the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine stated that "the circumstances under which the sexual 
activity occurred are relevant to the legal significance of the acts . . ." 
and that to find that sexual activity per se constitutes forgiveness would 
be "contrary to human experience." 17 
The Appeals Court quickly disposed of the wife's argument that the 
probate judge had erred in failing to find that cruel and abusive treat-
ment by the husband constituted a defense of recrimination.1s The 
court noted that this defense had been foreclosed by chapter 740 of 
the Acts of 1973.19 The court reasoned that the word "entertain" as 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 1342-43, 391 N.E.2d at 700. 
11 Id. at 1341-42, 391 N.E.2d at 700. The court, citing an opinion of the Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court, stated: "Condonation occurs when the injured spouse, with 
knowledge of the misconduct, undertakes expressly or impliedly to overlook and for-
give the wrongs and restores the other spouse unconditionally (or conditionally if 
there is no recurrence of the bad conduct) to the enjoyment of all marital rights." 
Id. (citing Littlefield v. Littlefield, 292 A.2d 204, 211 (Me. 1972) ). 
12 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1343, 391 N.E.2d at 700. 
13 Id. at 1342, 391 N.E.2d at 700. 
14 264 Mass. 291, 162 N.E.2d 663 (1928). 
15 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1343, 391 N.E.2d at 701. 
16 292 A.2d 204 (Me. 1972). 
17 Id. at 211-12. See also Chrisman v. Chrisman, 156 Ind. App. 388, 391, 296 
N .E.2d 904, 906 (1973) (refusal to find condonation where parties engaged in sexual 
relations while divorce proceedings were pending and parties were living apart); 
Halverson v. Halverson, 365 So.2d 600, 602 (La. App. 1978) ("isolated instances 
of sexual intercourse do not per se constitute reconciliation"). 
1S 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1344, 391 N.E.2d at 701-02. 
19 C.L. c. 208, § 1, amended by Acts of 1973, c. 740, provides in part: "[AJ 
divorce shall be adjudged although both parties have cause, and no defense upon 
18
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used in the statute was synonymous with "consider." 20 Thus, the 
court concluded, the statutory directive prohibiting the judge from 
entertaining the defense of recrimination was designed to apply at the 
point of judgment rather than at the point when the defense may 
have arisen.21 Therefore, the defense of recrimination was no longer 
available to the wife at the time of the trial. 
The Zild;ian opinion is a restatement of what has long been the rule 
in Massachusetts with regard to condonation. The plea of condonation 
is essentially a claim that the conduct complained of has been forgiven. 
It thus raises the issue of the intent of the party who is alleged to 
have condoned the conduct. The practitioner would be well advised 
to adduce as much evidence as possible on the issue of intent and not 
rely upon isolated incidents of sexual relations in order to establish a 
defense of condonation. 
§5.8. Annulment-Effect on Tenancy by the Entirety. In Gleason v. 
Galvin,l the Supreme Judicial Court considered the effect of an annul-
ment upon rights in real property held by a husband and wife as 
tenants by the entirety.2 The defendant-husband in Gleason, prior to 
his marriage to the plaintiff-wife, had purchased a single family house.3 
The defendant made the down payment with his own ,funds and had 
made all the mortgage payments.4 Subsequently, the plaintiff and de-
fendant were married, and the defendant transferred the property to 
himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety.5 Six years later, the 
marriage was annulled.6 Six years after the annulment the plaintiff 
filed a petition in the probate court for a partition and sale of the 
property.7 The defendant subsequently sought a declaratory judgment 
as to the rights of each party in the property.s A judge of the probate 
recrimination shall be entertained by the court." See also Inker, McGrath, & Katz, 
Abolition of Recrimination As a Defense In Divorce Cases, 18 BOSTON BAR J. No.5, 
at 7 (1974). . 
20 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1344, 391 N.E.2d at 702. 
21 ld. at 1344-45, 391 N.E.2d at 702 (citing Goodwin Bros. Leasing Inc. v. 
Nousis, 373 Mass. 169, 366 N.E.2d 38 (1977)). The court also quoted Chief Judge 
Fuld, who observed: "It is worthy of note that the overwhelming weight of au-
thority supports retroactive application of legislative creation or amendment of 
divorce ~ounds unless the statutory language employed precludes such a con-
struction.' 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1348, 391 N.E.2d at 703 (citing Gleason 
v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 36 n.5, 256 N.E.2d 513, 517 n.5, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347, 352 
n.5 (1970)). 
§5.8. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 597, 373 N.E.2d 357. 
2 ld. at 598, 373 N.E.2d at 358. 
3 ld. at 597, 373 N.E.2d at 358. 
41d. 
DId. 
61d. 
7 ld. 
SId. at 597-98, 373 N .E.2d at 358. 
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court allowed the petition for a partition and sale and dismissed the 
complaint for a declaration of rights.9 
The defendant appealed from both judgments.1o He argued that a 
decree of annulment renders a marriage void ab initio and, thus, no 
tenancy by the entirety was createdY He concluded, therefore, that 
since the home was his separate property before the marriage, after 
the annulment it again became his separate property.12 Thus, the 
plaintiff could have no interest in the property. 
The Court refused to accept the defendant's contention that an an-
nulment, in all cases, serves to make the marriage void ab initiO.13 
The Court observed that to say for all purposes that the marriage 
never existed was "unrealistic." 14 It noted that public policy requires 
that there be limits to the retroactive effects of an annulment.Hi The 
better rule, according to the Court, would be to recognize that trans-
actions concluded by parties to a voidable marriage during that mar-
riage ought not to be undone after the decree of annulment has been 
issued.16 Following the annulment, however, the parties could not 
validly hold the property as tenants by the entirety.H Rather, the 
Court ruled ,that the parties would, following the annulment, hold the 
property as tenants in common.1S 
After declining to find that the annulment rendered the marriage void 
for all purposes, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that the 
equities of the situation compelled an award of the property to hhn.19 
The Court affirmed the probate court's division of one-half to each of the 
parties.20 It stated that the defendant could not challenge the division 
because he had waited six years from the annulment to file his SUit.21 
In addition, the Court noted that there was no evidence indicating that 
the probate court did not consider the equities of the situation.22 The 
9. ld. at 598, 373 N.E.2d at 358. 
10 ld. 
11 ld. 
12 ld. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. 
16 ld. 
17 ld. See Fuss v. Fuss, 373 Mass. 445, 368 N.E.2d 276 (1977). 
18 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 598, 373 N.E.2d at 358. 
19 ld. at 599, 373 N .E.2d at 359. 
20 ld. 
21 ld. 
22 ld. The defendant argued that since he had paid for the property and home and 
maintained it during the marriage, the probate court was in error to award one half 
to his former wife. There was no evidence before the Supreme Judicial Court, how-
ever, concerning the equities of the plaintiff in the property. ld. 
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Court did, however, reverse the probate court's dismissal of the declara-
tory judgment complaint, holding that the rights of the parties should 
have been declared.23 It modified the lower court decree to provide that 
the parties hold the property as tenants in common after the annul-
ment.24 
The Gleason decision indicates that even though a subsequent annul-
ment renders a marriage void, the Court will not simply close its eyes 
to the property rights of the parties that have developed as a result of 
their relationship. Although technically a marriage did not exist be-
tween the parties (as is evidenced by the grant of the annulment), 
the Gleason Court recognized that the ownership interest of the parties 
in the realty could not similarly be dissolved. The Court limited such 
dissolution solely to the incidents of marriage and properly let the 
parties' property rights stand. 
§5.9. Divorce-Arbitration Clauses-Retention of Jurisdiction by 
Probate Court. In Bloksberg v. Bloksberg,l the Appeals Court held that 
even though a husband and wife had agreed to submit to arbitration 
any disputes arising out of their separation agreement and had incor-
porated the separation agreement into the decree nisi of divorce, the 
probate court was not precluded from enforcing the alimony or child 
support provisions of the decree. 2 
The husband and wife were granted a decree nisi of divorce on 
November 1, 1973.3 A previously executed separation agreement re-
quiring arbitration of any disputes arising out of the separation agree-
ment 4 and making provision for alimony and child support was incor-
porated into the decree nisi by reference.5 In November 1977, the 
plaintiff-wife brought an action in the probate court seeking to have 
the defendant-husband found in contempt, alleging that the husband 
had completely ceased alimony and child support payments as of Au-
gust 1977.6 In response, the husband filed a complaint seeking modi-
fication of the alimony and child support provisions of the decree and 
a stay of the contempt and modification actions pending their resolu-
tion by arbitration.7 The probate judge denied the husband's motion 
23 rd. (citing City of Boston v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation AuthOrity, 373 
Mass. 819, 370 N.E.2d 1359 (1977». 
24 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 599, 373 N.E.2d at 359. 
§5.9. 1 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 474, 387 N.E.2d 156. 
2 rd. at 476, 387 N.E.2d at 158. 
3 rd. 
4 rd. at 474 n.1, 387 N.E.2d at 157 n.l. 
5 rd. at 474, 387 N.E.2d at 157. 
6 rd. 
7 rd. at 474, 387 N.E.2d at 157-58. 
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for stay but reported to the Appeals Court the question of the correct-
ness of such denial. 8 
The Appeals Court held that the judge did not err in denying the 
husband's motion for stayY In so holding, the court stated that the 
decree nisi imposed upon the husband alimony and child support pay-
ment obligations parallel to those imposed by the separation agree-
ment. tO The court treated the arbitration clause of the separation 
agreement, which was incorporated by reference into the decree,ll as 
a component of the divorce decree and thus itself subject to modifica-
tion by the court,12 The court stated that the wife's contempt action 
and the husband's complaint for modification were brought pursuant' 
to the husband's obligations under the divorce decree, not the separa-
tion agreement.13 Since the provisions for alimony and child support 
were to remain in effect "until the further order of the court," 14 the 
probate court retained the power to modify or eliminate all provisions, 
including the provision for arbitration.10 
In reaching this decision, the court emphasized its concern that the 
continuing supervisory powers of the probate court not be subverted 
by the incorporation of an arbitration provision into a divorce decree.16 
The court refrained from discussing whether the enforcement of an 
arbitration provision like that in the instant case would be proper in 
view of the judge's denial of the stay.17 The court strongly suggested, 
however, that the power of a probate court to govern and regulate the 
provisions of a divorce decree should not be subject to usurpation or 
divestment, since this supervisory power had been granted and in fact 
mandated by statute.18 
The Bloksberg decision reaffirms the position taken by the Supreme 
Judicial Court in Ryan v. Ryan 19 and Knox v. Remick,20 which held 
8 ld. at 475, 387 N.E.2d at 158. The ruling was reported to the Appeals Court 
pursuant to Mass. R. Dom. ReI. P. 64 (1975). 
9 ld. 
10 ld. 
11 ld. See text at note 5 supra. 
12 ld. at 475, 387 N.E.2d at 158. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. The probate court has the power to modify obligations imposed under a 
divorce decree pursuant to c. 208, § 37. 
16 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 476, 387 N.E.2d at 158. "It follows that the 
provision for arbitration of disputes, assuming it to have been validly incorporated 
in the decree nisi, could not have the effect of precluding resort to the Probate 
Court for enforcement or modification of the alimony and child support provisions of 
the decree." ld. 
17 ld. 
18 ld. Chapter 208, § 37, grants the probate court the power to revise, modify, or 
revoke decrees of alimony or child support. 
19 371 Mass. 430, 358 N.E.2d 431 (1976). 
20 371 Mass. 433, 358 N.E.2d 432 (1976). 
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that the power of the probate court to modify and supervise its orders 
cannot be restricted by agreement between the parties.21 The prac-
titioner is thus advised that incorporation of an arbitration provision 
in the settlement of a domestic case may be upheld. Such a provision 
will not be recognized, however, to the extent that its effect would be 
to divest the probate court of its supervisory power. 
§5.IO. Divorce-Contempt. Binder v. Binder 1 concerned appeals 
taken from a judgment of the probate court reducing a former hus-
band's alimony obligations under a divorce decree and from a sub-
sequent judgment of the superior court concerning the former wife's 
contract action on a separation agreement which, although incorporated 
in the divorce decree, provided that the agreement would survive lhe 
decree.2 The Appeals Court held with respect to the probate court 
judgment that the evidence of changed circumstances of the former 
husband was insufficient to warrant a modification of the alimony 
provisions in the divorce decree.3 It also ruled that a contempt pro-
ceeding in probate court did not bar a subsequent contract action in 
superior court for arrearages under the separation agreement.4 
In March 1972, the parties entered into a marital separation agree-
ment by which the husband, a surgeon, agreed to pay the wife $300 
per week for her support, so long as she did not remarry, and $75,000 
as a property settlement to be funded in part with proceeds of the 
sale of the marital home and the balance by installments of $100 per 
week.5 One clause of the separation agreement provided that the 
parties should attempt to have the agreement incorporated into any 
divorce decree, but that, whether incorporated or not, the agreement 
would survive such a decree. 6 A decree of divorce nisi was entered on 
March 27, 1972, by the probate court.7 This decree incorporated the 
agreement by reference, thereby in effect ordering alimony in the 
amounts specified in the agreement.8 
On December I, 1975, the former wife filed two complaints for con-
tempt in the probate court, alleging that the husband was in arrears 
21 Id. at 436, 358 N.E.2d at 435; 371 Mass. at 432, 358 N.E.2d at 432. For a 
full discussion of Ryan and Knox, see Inker, Perocchi, & Walsh, Domestic Rela-
tions, 1977 ANN. 5URV. MASS. LAW § 1.1, at 3-7. 
§5.1O. 1 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. 5h. 1214, 390 N.E.2d 260. 
2 Id. at 1215-16, 390 N.E.2d at 262-63. 
3 Id. at 1219, 390 N .E.2d at 264. 
4 Id. at 1223, 390 N.E.2d at 266. 
5 Id. at 1214, 390 N.E.2d at 262. 
6 Id. at 1214-15, 390 N.E.2d at 262. 
7 Id. at 1215, 390 N.E.2d at 262. 
8 Id. 
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in his payments.o The husband filed a complaint for modification of 
his obligations under the divorce decree on December 8, 1976.10 At 
a hearing on these three complaints, the parties agreed that the arrear-
ages totalled $20,000,11 Evidence was presented and accepted by the 
probate judge that the husband's earning capacity as a surgeon had 
become impaired by a progressive, "osteoarthritic" condition affecting 
his knees and back, making surgery increasingly difficult for him.12 
The judge found that the husband had remarried and maintained 
an extravagant lifestyle with his second wife.13 He also found that 
the plaintiff first wife, by adopting a very conservative lifestyle, had 
accumulated some $80,000.14 The probate judge concluded that the 
payments called for by the divorce decree were "unrealistically high." 15 
He entered a judgment determining that arrearages were $20,600 as of 
January 5, 1977, and ordering that they be paid off at a rate of $50.00 
per week until they and any additional arrearages to the date of judg-
ment should be paid in full. 10 He also modified the divorce decree 
by redUcing the weekly support provision from $300 to $200 per week 
and by eliminating the requirement of further compliance with the 
property settlement provision other than payment of arrearages to the 
date of judgment on the timetable stated,17 The probate judge explicitly 
stated, both in his findings and judgment, that he was modifying only 
the obligations imposed by the divorce decree and not the previously 
identical obligations imposed by the separation agreement.1S 
The first wife filed an appeal from the judgment entered in the pro-
bate court on the contempt and modification complaints.19 She also 
filed a contract action in superior court to recover the $20,600 arrear-
ages.20 The husband answered that the judgment entered in the prohate 
court in the wife's action to recover the same arrearages operated either 
as res judicata or as a prior binding action to bar the superior court 
action. 21 This contention was overruled, and the husband appealed 
from the ensuing judgment entered for the former wife for the arrear-
ages.22 The former wife's appeal from the probate court judgment and 
9 ld. 
10 ld. 
11 ld. 
12 ld. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. 
16 ld. at 1215-16, 390 N.E.2d at 262. 
17 ld. at 1216, 390 N.E.2d at 262. 
18 ld. 
19 ld. 
20 ld. 
211d. 
22 ld. 
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the husband's appeal from the superior court judgment were consoli-
dated for argument in the Appeals Court.23 
The Appeals Court, noting that all questions of fact, law, and dis-
cretion are open to review, reversed the judge's findings and agreed 
with the wife's contention that the husband had failed to establish 
changed circumstances sufficient to justify modifying the divorce de-
cree.24 The court stated that the husband's tax returns for 1972, 1973, 
1974, and 1975 showed an increase rather than a decrease in income.25 
The court reasoned that the evidence indicated at best only a decline 
in the husband's earning potential but not in his actual earnings.26 No 
other evidence respecting the husband's change of circumstances affect-
ing arrearage up to January 5, 1977, was shown. Nor was there any 
indication of relevant changes in the former wife's circumstances.27 
The Appeals Court accordingly reversed the judgment of the probate 
court and remanded the contempt and modification cases to the probate 
court for further preceedings. 
The superior court judgment for the arrearages up to January 5, 
1977, was based on the principle that the parties to a separation agree-
ment may provide therein that the support provisions shall survive a 
subsequently entered divorce judgment, whether incorporated therein 
or not. 28 In such a case, "the agreement remains valid and may still 
be enforced by action at law after the [judgment]." 29 The husband 
disagreed with the superior court's application of this principle. He 
conceded that his former wife could recover in a contract action the 
difference between, for example, the $200 weekly support payment 
called for by the modified divorce decree and the $300 weekly support 
payment prOVided for by the separation agreement.30 He contended, 
however, that recovery should be confined to the time period commenc-
ing with the judgment of modification.31 That judgment, he contended, 
should be regarded as a prior adjudication of the arrearages, binding on 
the parties. Alternatively, should that judgment be reopened on appeal, 
the judgment should be viewed as a prior pending. action between the 
same parties involving the same cause of action, thus indicating dis-
23 [d. at 1216, 390 N.E.2d at 262-63. 
24 [d. at 1218-19, 390 N.E.2d at 263-64. 
25 [d. at 1218, 390 N.E.2d at 263. 
26 [d. at 1218, 390 N.E.2d at 263-64. 
27 [d. at 1219, 390 N.E.2d at 264. 
28 [d. at 1220, 390 N.E.2d at 264. 
29 [d. (citing Schillander v. Schillander, 307 Mass. 96, 98, 29 N.E.2d 686, 687 
(1942». 
30 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1222, 390 N.E.2d at 265. 
81 [d. 
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missal of the later action in favor of the earlier one.32 He argued that 
his former wife's claim for the $20,600 arrearages owed as of January 5, 
1977, was a single cause of action and that she was not entitled to pursue 
that claim for the same $20,600 arrearages in two separate actions in 
two different courts.3a 
The Appeals Court concluded that the separation agreement could 
not operate as a potential bar to such a modification. The court stated 
that "the modification may cause the alimony obligation imposed by 
the judgment to be different from that agreed to by the parties, but the 
obligations are not inconsistent or incompatible, each being capable 
of enforcement without infringing upon the other." 34 Furthermore, the 
probate court, having only jurisdiction conferred by statute, has no 
authority to hear civil actions for simple contract damages.35 Thus, the 
court concluded, because the claims are enforceable only by separate 
proceedings in different courts and because the law does not require a 
plaintiff to make an election between these claims, the wife could en-
force her rights under both the divorce judgment and under the separa-
tion agreement.36 
The Appeals Court stated further that a claim for arrearages under 
a divorce judgment and a claim for arrearages under the separation 
agreement are too dissimilar to treat as the same cause of action.37 The 
arrearages under the agreement are definite in amount, and, if the 
agreement is enforceable at all, the party to whom the arrearages are 
owed is entitled as a matter of law to recover the full amount in 
arrears.38 Rights under a divorce judgment are ephemeral in that the 
judgment can be revised downward at any time.39 The probate court 
could reduce the alimony provisions retroactively as well as prospec-
tively and could do so on a complaint for enforcement by contempt, 
even where no complaint for modification was before the court.40 
The Appeals Court then rejected the husband's contention that if his 
former wife could seek arrearages in superior court after having done 
so in probate court, her superior court claim must be confined to the 
32 ld. 
33 ld. 
34 ld. at 1223, 390 N.E.2d at 265. 
35 ld. at 1223, 390 N.E.2d at 266. See Charney v. Charney, 316 Mass. 580, 
582-83,55 N.E.2d 917,919 (1944). 
36 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1223, 390 N.E.2d at 266. 
37 ld. at 1224, 390 N.E.2d at 266. 
38 ld. 
391d. (citing Metcalf v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 288, 292 (1st Cir. 1959». 
40 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1224, 390 N .E.2d at 266 (citing Bloksberg v. 
Bloksberg, 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 474, 475-76, 387 N.E.2d 156, 158; Cohen 
v. Murphy, 368 Mass. 144, 147, 330 N.E.2d 473, 475 (1975); Watts v. Watts, 314 
Mass. 129, 133,49 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1943». 
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difference between the alimony called for in the separation agreement 
and that ordered by the probate judgment,4l The probate judgment, 
the court noted, was not one for $20,600, but rather a judgment for $50 
per week until $20,600 should have been paid.42 It thus constituted 
in legal effect a retroactive modification in the arrearages due under the 
divorce decree.43 The Appeals Court stated further that the former 
wife was entitled at all times, regardless of proceedings in the probate 
court, to enforce the divorce decree or to bring a civil action in the 
superior court for the difference between the amount the agreement 
required to have been paid and the amount which had in fact been 
paid toward that obligation.44 In affirming the judgment of the superior 
court the Appeals Court required that whatever amounts were re-
covered in enforcement of the superior court judgment must be credited 
toward the husband's alimony obligation under the probate decree.45 
In tum, whatever amounts were paid pursuant to a final judgment in 
the contempt proceeding in the probate court must be credited toward 
satisfaction of the superior court judgment.46 In this way, the spectre 
of double recovery could be avoided.47 
The issues presented in this case are not those of first impression. 
The significance of the case lies in the way the court applied existing 
law to the facts of the case. The case illustrates the proposition that 
in domestic relations cases the provisions of a valid separation agree-
ment remain in effect and may still be enforced in a contract action in 
superior court after a final judgment of divorce had been entered. 
§5.11 Foreign Divorce-Validity. In Colarusso v. Teacher's Retire-
ment Board,1 the Supreme Judicial Court considered whether a wife 
who did not appear or in any way participate in a foreign divorce 
proceeding instituted by her husband could attack the validity of such 
decree.2 The Court also considered whether the husband's lack of 
domicile in the foreign state rendered the foreign court without juris-
diction to grant such divorce. 3 
The parties in Colarusso were married in 1935 and lived together as 
husband and wife in Massachusetts.4 At some time the husband began 
41 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1225, 390 N.E.2d at 266. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 1225, 390 N.E.2d at 266-67. 
45 Id. at 1225, 390 N.E.2d at 267. 
46 Id. at 1226, 390 N.E.2d at 267. 
47 Id. 
§5.11. 1 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1747, 392, N.E.2d 844. 
2 Id. at 1749, 392 N.E.2d at 846. 
3 Id. at 1750-51, 392 N.E.2d at 846. 
4 Id. at 1748, 392 N.E.2d at 845. 
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to live with another woman (Frieda); he ceased living with his wife 
(Marie) after 1962.5 After an unsuccessful attempt in 1965 to obtain 
a divorce in Massachusetts from Marie,6 the husband went to Reno, 
Nevada, in July 1972.7 On October 3, 1972, the husband sought and 
obtained a decree of divorce from Marie.s The husband married Frieda 
that same day, and a few days later they returned to Massachusetts 
where he resumed his employment as a music teacher.9 
The Nevada divorce decree stated that Marie was duly served with 
summons, that she failed to appear and default was entered, and that 
testimony of the husband was received.10 The Nevada court found, 
among other things, that the husband was a bona fide resident of 
Nevada and had lived apart from his wife for more than a year prior 
to his filing of the divorce action. ll Marie denied having ever received 
notice of the proceedings and maintained that she did not know of the 
divorce until the husband and Frieda returned to Massachusetts.12 
The husband died in 1974, and both Frieda and Marie claimed 
certain retirement benefits as his surviving spouse.13 Frieda sued the 
Retirement Board ( the defendant in this action) for the surviving 
spouse benefits, and the board impleaded Marie and the· two adult 
children of her marriage to the husband.14 The superior court judge 
ruled that the Nevada divorce was invalid under section 39 of chapter 
208,15 and concluded that Marie was the lawful spouse.16 Frieda 
appealed, and the case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court 
on its own initiative.17 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court's decision but 
held that its reliance on chapter 208, section 39, which denies the 
5 ld. 
61d. 
7 ld. 
SId. 
91d. 
10ld. 
11 ld. 
12 ld. at 1749, 392 N.E.2d at 845. 
13 ld. at 1747, 392 N.E.2d at 845. 
14 ld. at 1748, 392 N.E.2d at 845. 
15 C.L. c. 208, § 39, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 400, § 39, provides: 
A divorce adjudged in another jurisdiction according to the. laws thereof by a 
court having jurisdiction of the cause and of both the parties shall be valid and 
effectual in this commonwealth; but if an inhabitant of this commonwealth goes 
into another jurisdiction to obtain a divorce for a cause occurring here while. 
the parties resided here, or for a cause which would not authorize a divorce 
by the laws of this commonwealth, a divorce so obtained shall be of no force 
or effect in this commonwealth. 
16 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1747, 392 N.E.2d at 845. He did so pursuant to 
C.L. c. 32 § 12(2), Option (d). 
17 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1748, 392 N.E.2d at 845. 
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validity of a divorce granted in another jurisdiction for a cause of action 
arising within the commonwealth,18 as grounds for invalidating the 
Nevada divorce was misplaced.19 The Court concluded that the Nevada 
decree was invalid for lack of jurisdiction; therefore, the section 39 
ruling was unnecessary.20 The Court ruled that because Marie did 
not appear or in any way participate in the Nevada proceedings, she 
could attack the validity of the divorce decree.21 In particular, it noted 
that since jurisdiction of the Nevada court was based upon the hus-
band's domicile in that state, Marie was free to challenge that jurisdic-
tion on the ground that the domicile requirement was not met.22 
The Supreme Judicial Court, examining the evidence before it,23 
found that the facts surrounding the husband's divorce from Marie and 
his subsequent marriage to Frieda clearly indicated that he never 
acquired domicile in Nevada.24 The Court noted that the husband had 
lived in Massachusetts for thirty-seven years before his sojourn to 
Nevada.25 He and Frieda remained in Nevada for less than three 
months.26 As soon as his divorce was granted, he married Frieda in 
Nevada and returned to Massachusetts.27 On this basis, the Court 
concluded that since the husband lacked domicile in Nevada, the 
Nevada court lacked jurisidiction to grant him a divorce.28 
The Colarusso decision reaffirms the Massachusetts position of not 
recognizing the validity of ex-parte divorce where the jurisdiction of the 
forum granting the divorce is later challenged. A decree of divorce 
is a conclusive adjudication of everything except the jurisdictional facts 
upon which it is founded, and domicile is a jurisdictional fact.29 Al-
though full faith and credit is usually given to a sister state's finding 
of proper jurisdiction to grant a divorce, the domiciliary forum may 
18 See note 15 supra. 
19 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1749, 392 N.E.2d at 846. The judge found the Nevada 
divorce invalid under c. 208, § 39, because it was granted for a cause of action 
that had accrued in Massachusetts and because Nevada: never had jurisdiction over 
both the husband and Marie. ld. 
20 ld. 
21 ld. (citing Heard v. Heard, 323 Mass. 357, 363, 82 N.E.2d 219, 223 (1948». 
22 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1749-50, 392 N.E.2d at 846. 
23 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1750, 392 N.E.2d at 846. The Court stated, "We 
accept the judge's findings unless they are clearly erroneous, but we have the 
evidence before us and may find facts in addition to those found by him." ld. (citing 
Nickerson v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 512, 513, 375 N.E.2d 
357, 358). 
24 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1751, 392 N.E.2dat 846. 
25 ld. at 1750, 392 N .E.2d at 846. 
261d. 
27 ld. 
28 ld. at 1751, 392 N.E.2d at 846. 
29 See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), and its progeny. 
29
Inker et al.: Chapter 5: Domestic Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1979
§5.12 DOMESTIC RELATIONS 173 
always relitigate the jurisdictional issue. 3o The practitioner would be 
ill advised to encourage a client to seek an ex parte foreign divorce, as 
its validity will be open to challenge at a subsequent date by the absent 
spouse.HI Furthermore, the practitioner should be aware that this issue 
will continue to arise in the commonwealth as the popularity of Haitian 
and Dominican Republic divorces grows. 
§5.12. Contempt-Assets v. Income Approach to Determination of 
Solvency. In Krokyn v. Krokyn 1 the Supreme judicial Court, in a 
crucial decision, held that a husband's ability to pay alimony arrearages 
to his first wife could be determined on the basis of his ownership 
interest in property held by him and his present wife as tenants by the 
entirety.:! In Krokyn, the Supreme Judicial Court shifted the analysis 
of ability to pay in alimony contempt cases from the husband's current 
income to his present ownership of capital assets, or his net worth, re-
gardless of whether such property could in fact be reached by his 
creditors. 
The parties in this case were divorced by a decree which became 
final on June 30, 1970.3 The divorce decree incorporated a separation 
agreement, which required the husband to pay a lump sum of $1992.00 
to the wife.4 It further required the husband to pay the wife the sum 
of $75.00 per week for her support, in biweekly installments, until the 
happening of certain specified events.5 The husband made the weekly 
payments for several years but ceased making them in September 1975.6 
On April 20, 1976, the wife filed a contempt petition.7 
Evidence presented at the contempt hearing showed that the husband 
was an architect employed by a corporation of which he was the 
president and the only stockholder.s His income, derived primarily 
from "management fees" paid by the corporation, was approximately 
30 The divorce decree is still valid in Nevada. A divorce that is not entitled to 
full faith and credit in one f9rum may nevertheless have satisfied due process require-
ments and remain valid in the state of rendition. 
31 The ex-parte foreign divorce may have further ramifications. It may affect who 
may claim as a "surviving spouse" (as in the instant case), areas involved in probate 
law, and even the issue of criminal sanctions for bigamy. 
§5.12. 1 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1417, 390 N.E.2d 733. 
2 Id. at 1422-23, 390 N.E.2d at 736. 
3 Id. at 1417, 390 N.E.2d at 734. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 1418, 390 N.E.2d at 734. 
7 Id. After the wife filed her contempt petition the husband sought a modifica-
tion of the original decree, and the judge received evidence on that issue. The judge 
took the question of modification under advisement. The record does not show what 
ruling, if any, was made thereon. Id. at 1419 n.4, 390 N.E.2d at 734-35 n.4. 
sId. at 1420, 390 N.E.2d at 735. 
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$13,000 in 1973, $18,000 in 1974 and $17,000 in 1975.9 He received 
no income in 1976.10 The corporation had recently been operating at 
a loss, relying on loans made by the second wife and various banks in 
order to pay its creditors.ll The only significant asset available to the 
husband at the time the probate court order was entered was the house 
owned by the husband and his second wife as tenants by the entirety.12 
The wife had supplied most of the funds needed to purchase and 
remodel the house.I3 The house was worth between $140,000 and 
$200,000 at the time of the hearing and was encumbered by a $70,000 
mortgage.14 Approximately $25,000 of the proceeds of the new mortgage 
loan had been used to pay the husband's business debts. I5 
The probate judge found the husband in arrears in the amount of 
$5,949.50.16 He concluded that the husband "at all times possessed, 
and still possesses, the ability to make the support payments called for 
in the agreement incorporated into the divorce decree, being the owner 
of a ~ interest in real estate having a present equity of at least 
$70,000." 17 The probate judge found the husband in civil contempt 
and sentenced him to ten days' imprisonment. The husband appealed, 
and the Supreme Judicial Court ordered the case transferred to it on 
its own motion. IS 
The sole question considered on appeal was whether the husband's 
interest in the house was sufficient to warrant a finding that he had the 
present ability to pay the arrearages in his support payments to his 
first wife at the time he was found in contempt.I9 Notwithstanding its 
recognition of the unique character and incidents of a tenancy by the 
entirety, the Court held that an ex-husband's capital assets, inctuding 
those held in tenancy by the entirety with his second wife, may be 
considered in addition to income in evaluating his ability to purge his 
contempt.20 Despite the equality of interest shared by husband and 
wife in a tenancy by the entirety, the Court noted that the weight of 
the law accorded the husband the exclusive right to possession and 
9 ld. 
10 ld. 
11 ld. 
12 ld. at 1421, 390 N.E.2d at 735. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. 
111 ld. 
16 ld. at 1418, 390 N.E.2d at 734. 
17 ld. 
18 Id. at 1418-19, 390 N.E.2d at 734. 
19 ld. at 1423, 390 N.E.2d at 736. 
20 Id. at 1422, 390 N.E.2d at 736, (citing Kay v. Kay, 37 N.Y.2d 632, 636, 339 
N.E.2d 143, 146, 376 N.Y.S.2d 443,446-47 (1975); Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 
2d 223, 226 (Fla. 1972». 
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income during the joint lives.21 He could sell the property, subject 
always to the wife's expectancy of full title should she outlive her 
husband. 22 His sole creditor could levy on that interest to satisfy his 
debts. In contrast, the wife's mere expectancy of title was neither 
alienable nor subject to execution by her sole creditors.23 Thus, despite 
the lack of evidence at trial of the value of the husband's interest in the 
house, the Court considered the presumptive value of his interest in 
the property sufficient to demonstrate his ability to pay, even though his 
second wife's cooperation would be required in order for the husband 
to liquidate his holding.24 The Court found support for its position in 
other jurisdictions,25 whose decisions were based primarily on the 
ground that contempt remedy did not implicate the rights of any class 
of creditor to attach particular property.26 Thus, the Court concluded 
that ownership of property held in a tenancy by the entirety could be 
considered in determining the husband's ability to pay his arrearages. 
21 ld. at 1423, 390 N.E.2d at 736 (citing Voigt v. Voigt, 252 Mass. 582, 583, 147 
N .E. 887, 887 (1925)). It should be noted that this decision was handed down before 
the statutory reform of the tenancy by the entirety which took effect on January 1, 
1980. Acts of 1979, c. 727 amends C.L. c. 209 by striking section 1 and substitut-
ing the following new section 1: 
The real and personal property of any person shall, upon marriage, remain the 
separate property of such person, and It married person may receive, receipt for, 
hold, manage and dispose of property, real and personal, in the same manner as 
if such person were sole. A husband and wife shall be equally entitled to the 
rents, products, income or profits and to the control, management and possession 
of property held by them as tenants by the entirety. 
The interest of a debtor spouse in property held as tenants by the entirety 
shall not be subject to seizure or execution by a creditor of such debtor spouse 
so long as such property is the principal residence of the nondebtor spouse; pro-
vided, however, both spouses shall be liable jOintly or severally for debts in-
curred on account of necessaries furnished to either spouse or to a member of 
their family. 
The statute as amended renders the rights of husband and wife substantially equiv-
alent with respect to property held in tenancy by the entirety. Of particular impor-
tance in predicting the precedential value of the Krokyn opinion is the explicit 
legislative pronouncement, in the second paragraph of c. 209, § 1, that creditors 
cannot reach the interest of a debtor spouse in property held by the entirety if that 
property is the principal residence of the nondebtor spouse. This might seem to 
prevent the courts, in cases arising after the effective date of the statute, from taking 
property held by the entirety into account in evaluating the ability of one of the 
spouses to satisfy alimony arrearages. The Court, however, expressly distinguishes 
between the determination of ability to pay as evidenced by ownership of a valuable 
asset and the question of whether payment can be enforced directly against that 
asset. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1427, 390 N.E.2d at 737. Thus it seems at least 
theoretically possible that even if payment could not ultimately be enforced against 
a particular asset, it could nevertheless, under Krokyn, be considered in evaluating 
ability to pay. 
22 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1423, 390 N.E.2d at 736. 
23 ld. (citing Licker v. Cluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 407,164 N.E. 613, 615 (1929). 
241d. 
25 ld. at 1424-26, 390 N.E.2d at 736-37. 
26 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1426, 390 N.E.2d at 737. 
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The Court also observed that not only precedent but also common 
sense and basiC' concepts of fairness supported the notion that owner-
ship of a valuable asset demonstrated ability to pay without further 
inquiry as to whether payment could be enforced against the asset.27 
It found no error for the probate court to exert reasonable pressure, 
including an adjudication of contempt, to eneourage the husband "to 
exercise ingenuity in managing his affairs so as to fulfill his paramount 
support obligations." 28 It noted that neither the eourt nor the ag-
grieved party obligee should be required to map in detail the method 
by which the husband should transform an asset into cash.29 The Court 
noted the general principle that "[t]he law does not require that an 
obligor be allowed to enjoy an asset-such as a valuable home or the 
beneficial interest in a spend-thrift trust-while he neglects to provide 
for those persons whom he is legally required to support." 30 Thus, 
the Court, concluding that both reason and precedent justified treating 
the ownership of assets as relevant evidence of ability to pay, re-
manded the case to the probate court for further proceedings. 
The Supreme Judicial Court's adoption of the approaoh emphasizing 
a contemner solvency and not his ability to reach his assets raises 
several serious policy considerations for a number of reasons. First, 
by so ruling, the Supreme Judicial Court may have Sidestepped the 
constitutional prerequisite for incarceration by civil process, the present 
ability of the contemner to release himself from prison by eompliance 
with a court order. Second, the decision ultimately may affect the 
rights of second wives in property held as tenants by the entirety 
despite its intention to abstain from that result.31 Finally, the Court 
has fashioned a decision that may in fact prOvide a relief for the 
plaintiff's ex-spouse.32 
It appears from this case that the contemner may be imprisoned to 
coerce payment not only out of present income or assets but also when 
his net worth is equal to or greater than his debts, regardless of whether 
the property may be reached by the creditors. Ordinarily, in domestic 
relations cases, a person held in civil contempt for non-payment of 
27 Id. at 1427, 390 N.E.2d at 737. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 1427, 390 N.E.2d at 737-38. 
30 Id. at 1427, 390 N.E.2d at 738. 
31 As the second wife was not a party in the litigation, the Supreme Judicial Court 
did not consider her rights in the property held as tenants by the entirety. Therefore, 
it declined to express an opinion on the merits of the husband's argument relative 
to the effect, if any, of the Equal Rights Amendment on the rule giving a husband a 
greater possessory interest in property held by the entireties. Id. at 1430, 390 
N.E.2d at 739. 
32 See 14 SUFF. U. L. REV. 79 (1980). 
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arrem'ages may not be imprisoned unless the court finds the contemner 
is presently able to pay the arrearage and yet wilfully refuses to obey 
the court's order. In Krokyn, however, the Supreme Judicial Court in 
effect has created a new substandard for incarceration for civil con-
tempt. As a result, absent a present ability to purge contempt by 
complying with a court order, imprisonment of a civil contemner loses 
its intended remedial purpose and becomes unconstitutionally punitive.33 
When the contemner's only available asset is an interest in land held 
by tenants by the entirety, the nature of that ownership should be 
crucial to the question of one's ability to pay. At the time of this case, 
the Supreme JudiCial Court may have vitiated the common law elements 
of a tenancy by the entirety. The rights of the second wife may in fact 
ultimately be affected. Alienation by either the husband or the wife 
of property held in a common law tenancy by the entirety will not 
defeat the right of the survivor to the entire estate on the death of the 
other. There can be no severance of such estate by the other and no 
partition during their joint lives. The survivor becomes seized as sole 
owner of the whole estate regardless of anything the other may have 
done. Thus, without the wife's consent, her survivorship interest can-
not be destroyed or dislodged from the entirety. 34 Yet, the Krokyn 
decision left open the question of how the defendant could purge con-
tempt without the second wife's cooperation. The Court also failed to 
comment on the effect of the Krokyn decision on the rights of the 
second wife in such property should the husband be forced to sell it, 
even though she may have contributed a Significant amount to purchase 
and/ or remodel that property. 
In aligning itself with the minority position of Howard v. Howard,35 
which determines the ability to pay in terms of all property held by the 
defendant, regardless of whether it may be reached by creditors, the 
Supreme Judicial Court had disclaimed the relevancy of the plaintiffs 
access to the defendant's interest in the tenancy by the entirety. If 
circumstances should arise where the second wife refuses to cooperate 
in the sale of the asset held in a tenancy by the entirety, the first wife 
would have difficulty acquiring the amount of any arrearage. In hold-
ing that whether an asset may be reached by the defendant's creditors 
is irrelevant, the Court has afforded to the plaintiff relief which is 
questionable at best.3u In some jurisdictions, the extent of a defendant's 
access to an asset, not that of a creditor's access, is dispositive of a 
33 [d. at 81. 
34 See Bernatavicius v. Bernatavicius, 259 Mass. 486, 487, 156 N.E. 685, 686 
( 1927) and cases cited. 
35 130 So. 2d 83 (Fla. App. 1961), cen. denied, 133 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1961). 
36 See 14 SUFFOLK V.L. REV. 79, 91 (1980). 
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defendant's ability to pay. This same principle should apply with equal 
force to contempt proceedings in domestic relations cases.37 
The policy implications of the Krokyn decision will not be so serious 
if the holding is construed very narrowly. In Krokyn, the husband did 
not notify the probate court of the decline in his income before he 
ceased making the alimony payments. He did not file his complaint for 
modification until after the filing of his ex-wife's complaint for con-
tempt. Yet the court did not assess any arrearages after the husband's 
complaint was filed, seemingly allowing his complaint for modification 
from the date it was filed. Thus, if the husband had made a timely 
filing of his complaint for modification, it would, in all likelihood, have 
been allowed. Thus, if future defendants make timely notice of any 
changes in their economic situations, they may be absolved of their 
arrearages rather than be forced to comply with a court order by selling 
their assets. Therefore, timely notification to the probate court of a 
change in circumstances could avoid the harsh effects of the Krokyn 
decision. 
37 ld. at 87. This commentator has criticized the Krokyn Court for its indifference 
to alternate solutions. Possible alternate solutions proposed for discharging the hus-
band's obligations have been: parole work programs, installment arrangements, or 
actual execution against the husband's property interest. ld. at 93. 
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